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 Abstract 
In the current process of restructuring the Dutch Bankruptcy Act, the present idea is that 
the new Act should reward risk-taking by entrepreneurs in order to stimulate innovative en-
trepreneurship. The rights of the creditors may therefore need to be adjusted in security at 
some level. For such adjustment to be implemented, knowledge on the impact of creditor 
rights on entrepreneurial activity and - more general - on the impact of financial structure 
on economic growth is deemed necessary. 
Some recent studies analyze the effect of financial development, financial structure and le-
gal instruments on economic growth. These studies reveal that financial development is im-
portant for economic growth, whereas the role of financial structure (a country’s financial 
system can be characterized market-based as opposed to bank-based) is unclear. Secured 
creditor rights were found to be associated with growth. However, the cross-country analy-
ses include many underdeveloped countries and may suffer from other shortages.  
The present paper builds on the available studies, making the estimated relations more suit-
able to an environment appropriate to the Netherlands. It also incorporates some of the fi-
nancial and legal measures in an alternative model designed for explaining relations be-
tween entrepreneurial activity and economic growth. 
From our analysis, it is found that having a market-based system induces economic growth. 
Our results, when considered in its entirety, also indicate that creditor rights may affect 
starting firms and existing firms differently. At the one hand, a relaxation of creditor rights 
may enhance entrepreneurial activity. This conclusion can be drawn from the exercises with 
the alternative model. On the other hand, high-secured creditor rights lead to increasing av-
erage firm size. Existing expanding firms can be the major cause of this.  The analyses thus 
suggest that policy directed to the rights of creditors may need to distinguish between 
creditors of startups and creditors of existing firms. 
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1  Introduction 
An entrepreneur deciding to pursue the idea of starting a firm often has to go through 
many stages before the firm is active. For example he or she has to register in the Chamber 
of Commerce, may have to arrange housing and search for first clients.  
An important part that goes through these preparation stages is acquiring the necessary 
funds. Entrepreneurial activity involves taking financial risks. The risk-taking part is of course 
also situated at the side of the creditors. Creditors generally have many rights to compen-
sate for the risks they are taking. When the founded firm does not perform well and the en-
trepreneur has to stop its activities (whether or not ending up in a bankruptcy), the estab-
lished creditors like banks and other financial institutions are often (legally) the first in row 
to claim their share.  
When aiming at promotion of entrepreneurial activity through legal instruments, attention 
has to be paid to both the entrepreneur’s angle and the creditor’s angle
1. If creditor rights 
diminish, the total amount of supply of start-up capital may get into danger. However, in-
creasing creditor rights may lead to the problem that the entrepreneur perceives the risk of 
the whole project (the fear of having great debts for lengths of years in case of bankruptcy) 
as too high.  
In the current process of restructuring the Dutch Bankruptcy Act, the present idea is that 
the new Act should reward risk-taking by entrepreneurs in order to stimulate innovative en-
trepreneurship. The rights of the creditors may therefore need to be adjusted in security at 
some level. For such adjustment to be implemented, knowledge on the impact of creditor 
rights on entrepreneurial activity and - more general - on the impact of financial structure 
on economic growth is deemed necessary. Appropriate studies were until recently mainly 
absent. However, contributions of Rajan and Zingales (1998), Beck and Levine (2000) and 
OECD (2001) illustrate the current relevancy of the subject
2. These studies unanimously 
point out that high-developed financial systems are linked to economic growth. Beck and 
Levine also suggest that secured creditor rights are positively associated with growth in the 
number of firms. However, this result may be due to their methodology used and especially 
to the group of countries selected. 
The present study builds on the above-mentioned contributions, making the estimated rela-
tions more suitable to the environment appropriate to The Netherlands. It also incorporates 
some financial structure measures in an existing model explaining ‘business ownership and 
growth’ as described in Carree et al. (2002). 
 
1
   In a study on a sample of Dutch nascent entrepr eneurs, people with high startup capital needs were relatively 
often found to have stopped their activities (Van Gelderen et al., 2001). However, among the people that actu-
ally start a firm, business founders with high startup capital are generally more successful than people with low 
startup capital. This difference in effect of f inancial needs on performance between the pre-startup phase and 
the post  –startup phase is possibly caused by the existence of many so-called ‘dreamers’ among nascent entre-
preneurs. Creditors apparently correctly identified these dreamers. On the other hand, the financial institutions 
may also have ‘missed’ some promising entrepreneurs that found themselves confronted with high-powered 
creditors and backed off. 
2
   From this point forward we will often refer to the studies by Rajan and Zingales and by Beck and Levine without 
providing the year of publication. In doing so we especially aim at answering the following two questions: 
1.  Is the effect of financial structure and legal instruments on growth found by Beck and 
Levine different when a selection of OECD countries is considered? 
2.  What can be concluded for the contribution of creditor rights to economic growth? 
Besides these two main points of interest, we also look at some possible drawbacks of the 
mentioned studies and make suggestions that may improve the research.    
The next chapter considers the methodology used by Rajan and Zingales as well as Beck and 
Levine. Special attention is paid to their measure of external dependence. This chapter also 
sets out the main differences with the model described by Carree et al. (2002). Chapter 
three confronts the estimation results of Beck and Levine with the results when their model 
is estimated for developed countries only. The fourth chapter adds financial structure in an 
existing model explaining the relationship between business ownership and economic 
growth. Chapter five considers some drawbacks of the study and some suggestions for new 
determinants of financial structure. This paper concludes with a discussion. 
 EIM Business & Policy Research    7 
2  Methodology 
2.1  Financial development & structure, legal instruments and growth 
This section gives a brief description of the model used by Beck and Levine. 
Growth measures 
Growth is measured as growth in total value added within an industry, in the period 1980-
1989. The growth of value added can be decomposed in: 
•  Growth of the number of firms 
•  Growth in average size of firms 
The decomposition is not exclusive because productivity is also of importance. Growth in the 
number of firms is often accompanied by decline in average size, as new firms are relatively 
small. However, if the economic atmosphere is favorable, the existing firms may grow in the 
same period. Thus, in such situation, it is not known what determined the growth (or de-
cline) in average size. For our analysis, we will therefore particularly study the growth of the 
number of firms and the growth of value added.  
Estimation 
To investigate the effect of the financial related and the legal-related variables on growth 
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The first three terms on the right hand side reflect the constants, including country-specific 
and industry-specific constants
1. The fourth term measures the share of industry j in manu-
facturing in country k in 1980. It is the final term that is of special interest. The matrix X 
contains the country-specific measures of financial structure, financial development and/or 
legal instruments to be included in each regression. The country-specific X
i variables are 
multiplied by an industry-specific variable named EXDEP. EXDEP measures the exter-
nal dependence of an industry. Rajan and Zingales and Beck and Levine hypothesize that 
the industrial structure of external dependence is the same for all countries. Section 2.2 
takes a closer look at this variable. First, we describe the independent variables obtained 
from Beck et al. (2000) and La Porta et al. (1999). 
Measures of Financial Development 
Financial development indicates the efficiency with which financial intermediaries and mar-
kets reveal information and exert corporate control.  
1.  Finance Activity is a measure of the overall activity of the financial intermediaries 
and markets. It is defined as the log of the product of Private Credit, the value of 
credits by financial intermediaries to the private sector divided by GDP, and Value 
 
1
   To preserve identification of the model, the parameter of one country dummy and one industry dummy is ex-
cluded in the estimations. Traded, the value of total shares traded on the stock market exchange divided by 
GDP. Private Credit includes both bank and non-bank intermediaries. Value Traded 
measures the activity of the stock market trading volume as a share of national 
output and thus indicates the degree of liquidity that stock markets provide to 
economic agents. 
2.  Finance Size is a measure of the overall size of the financial sector. It is defined as 
the log of the sum of Private Credit and Market Capitalization. Market Capitaliza-
tion is defined as the value of listed shares divided by GDP, and thus measures the 
size of stock markets relative to the economy. 
3.  Finance Aggregate is the first principal component resulting from a factor analysis 
on Finance Activity and Finance Size. 
See Beck and Levine (2000) for a more detailed description
1. 
Measures of Financial Structure 
The variables measuring financial structure are all indicators of market-based systems (+) 
versus bank-based systems (-). They are described below. 
1.  Structure Activity indicates the activity of stock markets relative to the activity of 
banks. It is defined as the log of the ratio of Value Traded and Bank Credit. Bank 
Credit equals the claims of the banking sector on the private sector as a share of 
GDP. Compared to Private Credit, we exclude claims of non-bank financial inter-
mediaries to thus focus on the commercial banking sector. 
2.  Structure Size indicates the size of stock markets relative to the size of the banking 
sector and is defined as the log of the ratio of Market Capitalization and Bank 
Credit. 
3.  Structure Aggregate is the first principal component resulting from a factor analysis 
on Structure Activity and Structure Size 
Measures of Legal Policy Instruments 
The following legal variables, derived from the study by La Porta et al. (1999) are dealt with: 
1.  Creditor is an index of the degree to which the legal codes of the country protect 
the claims of secured creditors in the case of reorganization or liquidation of a 
company. It ranges from zero to four and is the sum of four dummy variables that 
indicate whether (i) the reorganization procedure does not impose an automatic 
stay on assets, thereby not preventing secured creditors from taking possession of 
loan collateral, (ii) secured creditors are ranked first in the case of liquidation, (iii) 
management does not stay in charge of the firm during reorganization, thereby 
enhancing creditors’ power, and (iv) management needs creditors’ consent when 
filing for reorganization. In economies with higher values of Creditor, outside in-
vestors have more rights relative to the management and other stakeholders, and 
should therefore be more willing to provide the external resources that industries 
need.  
2.  Anti-Director measures the rights of the (minority) shareholders. It is an index of 
the degree to which the legal codes of the country protect minority shareholder 
rights. It ranges from zero to six and is the sum of six dummy variables that indi-
cate whether (i) shareholders are allowed to mail their proxy vote to the firm, (ii) 
 
1
   The variables Finance Dummy and Structure Dummy were also introduced in Beck and Levine. However, these 
variables were not used and are excluded here. EIM Business & Policy Research    9 
shareholders are not required to deposit their shares prior to the General Share-
holders’ Meeting, (iii) cumulative voting or proportional representation of minori-
ties on the board of directors is allowed, (iv) an oppressed minority mechanism is in 
place, (v) the minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to 
call for an Extraordinary Shareholders’ Meeting is less than or equal to 10 percent, 
and (vi) shareholders have preemptive rights that can only be waived by a share-
holders’ vote. In economies with higher values of Anti-Director, minority share-
holder are better protected against expropriation by management and large share-
holders and should therefore be more willing to provide the external resources that 
industries need. 
3.  Rule of Law is an assessment of the law and order tradition of a country that 
ranges from 10, strong law and order tradition, to 1, weak law and order tradition. 
This measure was constructed by ICRG and is an average over the period 1982-
1990. In countries with a higher law and order tradition, outside investors can 
more easily enforce their claims and rights and should therefore be more willing to 
provide external finance. 
2.2  The proxy of external dependence 
How is the proxy calculated? 
An important part in the analyses of Rajan and Zingales and Beck and Levine is the use of a 
proxy of external dependence. The proxy is calculated by Rajan and Zingales using the 
following steps.  
-  The external financial needs of US companies over the 1980’s are computed. Source: 
Standard and Poor’s Compustat (1994). These data are limited to relatively large firms. 
Nevertheless:  ‘The amount of external finance used by large firms in the United States is 
likely to be a relatively pure measure of their demand for external finance’. Also: ‘For most 
of the paper, we will take the amount of external finance used by U.S. firms in an industry 
as a proxy for the desired amount foreign firms in the same industry would have liked to 
raise had their financial markets been more developed’. (Rajan and Zingales, 1998, page 
564) 
This last part is important for interpretations in the analyses. In the estimated equations, 
the measure of actual financial development interacts with the measure of desired exter-
nal dependence belonging to optimal (i.e. U.S.) financial development. 
-  Distinction between external and internal finance. ‘We are interested in the amount of de-
sired investment that cannot be financed through internal cash flows generated by the 
same business. Therefore, a firm’s dependence on external finance is defined as capital 
expenditures minus cash flow from operations, divided by capital expenditures. Cash flow 
from operations is broadly defined as the sum of cash flow from operations (Compustat 
#110) plus decreases in inventories, decreases in receivables, and increases in payables. 
(Rajan and Zingales, 1998, page 564) 
-  Aggregation of these ratios over time and across companies. Average values are calcu-
lated as medians. 
-  Also, a distinction is made between young and mature firms (young firms depend more 
heavily on external finance). The authors assume that technological differences (between industries) persist across coun-
tries, so that an industry’s dependence on external funds as identified in the United States 
can be used as a measure of its dependence in other countries.  
Is it a good proxy? 
The authors acknowledge the importance of their assumption that the dependence of U.S. 
firms on external finance is a good proxy for the demand for external funds in other coun-
tries. They mention four supporting reasons for their assumption: 
1.  In steady state equilibrium there will not be much need for external funds. Much 
of the demand for external funds is likely to arise as a result of technological shocks 
that raise an industry’s investment opportunities beyond what internal funds can sup-
port. Such shocks are generally global. 
2.  Even if new investment opportunities generated by worldwide shocks differ 
across countries, the amount of cash flow produced by existing firms in a certain in-
dustry is likely to be similar. 
3.  The authors also use the external dependence for U.S. firms calculated over the 
1970s, in case most countries are expected to lag behind the United States.  
4.  “...that we only have a noisy measure of the need for funds creates a bias 
against finding any interaction between dependence and financial development.” 
Though the last argument is not convincing, the others do make some sense. External funds 
are rather broadly defined. Moreover, note that the analysis is structural. Otherwise, the ar-
gument that shocks are global would not hold, as there would be differences in timing be-
tween countries. Still, results may be quite sensitive to the used proxies of external depend-
ence.  
Can alternative measures be found? 
It will be a difficult task to gather proxies for external dependence for all countries. Rajan 
and Zingales provide additional proxies for young US firms and for mature US firms. How-
ever, they do not really discuss their results when using these alternatives. Especially the 
proxy for young firms (depending more heavily on external dependence) may be linked to 
the growth of the number of firms. In this way, more light can be shed on the role of credi-
tor rights for young firms.  
Using the two alternative proxies in the present study can thus be of assistance for two rea-
sons: 
-  Roughly investigating to what extent the use of a certain proxy matters for the 
conclusions. 
-  Taking a closer look at the relation of young firms and growth of the number of 
firms. 
These exercises are shown in the next chapter. We can also circumvent the problem of using 
a single external dependence measure by discarding the industry dimension and adding the 
time dimension.  The external dependence measure used is then redundant as it only distin-
guishes between industries. We apply this in chapter 4 using an existing cross-country time 
series model. 
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3  Analyses within OECD countries 
Rajan and Zingales and Beck and Levine pool all countries and make no distinction between 
developed and underdeveloped countries. Both studies find, as OECD (2001), that Financial 
Development enhances economic growth. Beck and Levine (2001) also find that countries 
with more secured creditor rights exhibit relatively higher growth in the number of firms. It 
is conceivable that this finding is due to the absence of distinction between developed and 
underdeveloped countries. Security rights may especially enhance growth for underdevel-
oped countries, where a solid base for moneylenders is needed in order to create a consid-
erable amount of financial capital supply in the first place. In the developed countries (that 
we for our convenience equate to the OECD members in the sample, see Table 1), this solid 
base might already have been created and may at some point discourage nascent entrepre-
neurs with risk-involved plans to pull their ideas through. 
Table 1  Classification of developed and underdeveloped countries 












































In this chapter we follow the ‘procedure’ of Beck and Levine. However, we concentrate on 
the main points of interests as stated in the introducing chapter. We subsequently discuss 
our results with respect to financial development, financial structure and legal instruments 
(with special interest for creditor rights). As Beck and Levine, we use the Instrumental Vari-
able approach to control for simultaneity bias and reverse causality
1.  
3.1  Financial Development 
The influence of financial development on economic growth that was found in Rajan and 
Zingales (1998), Beck and Levine (2000) and OECD (2001) remains undisputed when distinc-
 
1
   The estimated equations suggest that an exogenously given level or structure of financial sector activity might 
interact with the external dependence of industries to determine industry growth rates. However, financial mar-
kets and institutions might have arisen due to a given industrial structure. Instruments included are legal origin 
dummies and religion variables, provided by La Porta et al. (1999).  tion is made between developed and underdeveloped countries
1. Thus, the efficiency with 
which financial intermediaries and markets reveal information and exert corporate control is 
an important indicator for economic growth. The Netherlands is ranked among the highest 
in the sample considering financial development. Only Japan, the United States and Singa-
pore have higher rankings. 
3.2  Financial Structure: market based vs. bank based 
When the financial structure is modeled instead of financial development, Beck and Levine 
reach an inconclusive effect. A conclusion whether market-based systems or bank-based 
systems were favorable for economic growth could not be drawn. 
However, our analysis within the OECD countries indicates that having a market-based sys-
tem is associated with growth in value added. This is particularly caused by growth in the 
number of firms and not by growth in the average size of the firms. The Netherlands does 
not reveal a particular financial structure; according to the statistics of the Worldbank data-
base described in Beck et al. (2000) it is tentatively directed towards a market-based system.   
The variables on financial structure correlate substantially with the financial development 
variables. We therefore do not attempt estimating the effects of financial development and 
financial structure together in a single estimation
2.  
3.3  Creditor rights and other legal variables 
The legal instruments are of special interest. Each country has specific legislation on share-
holders rights and creditors rights and a specific assessment of the law and order tradition. 
How does this part of the legal system affect growth?  
First a comment on the methodology used by Beck and Levine. They choose to incorporate 
all three legal instruments (described in section 2.1) in a single equation. Similar to the ar-
guments made in the previous section, some danger in making interpretations is involved. It 
appears that the legal variables are quite heavily correlated with the financial variables (at 
least, within the OECD countries). Within industries, this correlation only holds for the Rule 
of Law Variable. 
Appendix I, tables I-III show the estimation results for the OECD countries, analogous to the 
estimations described in tables 7 and 10 in Beck and Levine. It appears that the influences 




   Estimation results are not reported here but they are available on request. 
2
   When all industries are considered, correlation between financial development and financial structure is negative. 
However, within each industry, correlations are (significantly) positive. Note that for each industry, the country-
specific financial values are multiplied by the same external dependence value. Beck and Levine incorporate both 
measures in a single estimation. The danger in this is that combinations of these correlated variables will result in 
industry-specific effects that are directly linked to the industry dummies. The estimated effects may then be bi-
ased. Beck and Levine find – while the effect of financial development remains positive - that bank-based systems 
are tentatively associated with growth. This outcome may be caused by the negative correlations between finan-
cial structure and financial activity over the whole sample.  EIM Business & Policy Research    13 
To further explore these relations, we estimate three models. In each model we also use the 
two alternatives for the proxy of external dependence (i.e. young firms and mature firms) in 
each model
1. The models are the following. 
1.  The model of Beck and Levine was reproduced and also estimated for the selec-
tion of OECD countries. This is the model including one financial structure variable 
and three legal variables (Tables 7 and 10 in Beck and Levine). 
2.  To model 1 was added: (i) unemployment and (ii) labor income share as explaining 
variables (instead of anti director and rule of law). This was only possible for the 
group of OECD-members. 
3.  Model 1 was estimated, where the combined creditor variable was replaced by a 
dummy variable, indicating whether secured creditors are ranked first in the case 
of liquidation. 
A summary of the results is depicted in table IV of Appendix I. The rule of law appears to be 
persistent for explaining the growth in the number of firms. Contrary to the results of the 
analysis among all countries, creditor rights are not linked to growth in the number of firms 
when the OECD-countries are studied. However, it does matter for growth in average size. 
These results suggest that some distinction is present between the effects of creditor rights 
for starting businesses and for existing businesses. Perhaps then some distinction should 
also be made for the rights creditors of starting businesses and creditors of existing busi-
nesses.  
The effects found for unemployment and profitability should be questioned. These typical 
temporal variables are possibly not appropriate in this structural model, as a time dimension 




    A fourth model not described in this paper tested a possible non-linear impact of secured creditor rights on 
economic growth: it was hypothesized that extreme legislation (i.e. if the rights of creditors were very high or 
very low) was favorable for economic growth. The results from estimating this model did not provide any evi-
dence for this hypothesis.  4  Accounting for other determinants of growth 
The model described in chapters 2 and 3 merely estimates relations for the financial devel-
opment, financial structure and legal development variables and takes country-effects and 
industry-effects into account using dummies. 
Of course, other determinants of growth exist. The assumption that all other determinants 
are captured by the dummy variables may be questioned. Therefore we will incorporate 
some measures used by Beck and Levine in a time series model that is designed for explain-
ing the effect of the number of business owners relative to labor force (i.e. the business 
ownership rate) on economic growth among OECD countries
1. 
To summarize the most important differences with the model used by Beck and Levine: 
-  The dependent variable is the change in the number of business owners relative to 
labor force. Thus, growth in number of firms is scaled on the potential supply of busi-
ness owners. 
-  An important characteristic of the model is that it estimates an error correction 
mechanism for the change in the business ownership rate, where this change is – be-
sides the error correction- determined by per capita income (in logarithms, a quad-
ratic term is added to allow for a nonlinear relationship), unemployment and 
profitability
2.   
-  From the results of the error correction equation, an equilibrium business ownership 
rate is derived that depends on the per capita income level (as an indicator of total 
wealth). The derived equilibrium is assumed to be uniform for all OECD countries and 
is seen to take on a U-shaped form. A second equation then investigates whether de-
viations from the derived equilibrium lead to penalties in economic growth. The equi-
librium is then used as an optimum. 
We used this model to further explore the impact of financial and legal structure on eco-
nomic growth. The results shown in Table 2 are interesting. It appears that by adding finan-
cial determinants, the observed change in business ownership rate is significantly better ex-
plained. Secured creditor rights affect the growth of the business ownership rate negatively 
and market-based financial structures are associated with increases in the business owner-
ship rate. Using the results, a one-point decrease in creditor rights (i.e. altering one of the 
four components of this index variable by changing some legal code towards less protection 
of creditors) would in this model ceteris paribus lead to a structural increase of the business 
ownership rate of 0.2 percent point every four-year period. Based on the 1996 level of the 
labor force, this means some 14,000 additional firms each four-year period
3. Note that in 
adding determinants in model III, the other determinants do not diminish in predictive 
power.  The labor income share even becomes significant with the hypothesized sign. 
 
1
   This model is part of EIM’s SCALES modeling program, which is financed by the Dutch Ministry of Economic 
Affairs. See Carree et al. (2002) for a detailed description and Van Stel (2003) for a description of the underlying 
dataset.  
2
   OECD (2001) also uses an error correction approach 
3
   The alternative creditor variable (a dummy indicating whether creditors are ranked first in row and as such one of 
the four determinants of the compounded measure) did not result in significant outcomes.  EIM Business & Policy Research    15 
This exercise shows that using a different model may result in different conclusions. The es-
timated relations for financial structure and creditor rights alter dramatically when other de-
terminants are accounted for
1. At this point, it is hard to say what is best. Beck and Levine 
distinguish industries, though this distinction is rather artificial because a single variable (the 
measure of external dependence) is used for all variables. The alternative model in this sec-
tion does not distinguish between industries. However, it does have a time dimension. 
 
Table 2  Estimation results for explaining the four-yearly change in business ownership rates 
across OECD countries in the period 1980-1996.  
  (I) 
Current estimation 
results Carree et al. 
(II) 
Estimating (I) for selec-




Constant  0.109   (2.5)  0.113   (2.3)   0.232   (4.6)  
Error correction coef.  0.120  (5.4)  0.122  (4.9)  0.176  (6.8) 
Unemployment  0.063  (4.5)  0.065  (4.1)  0.086  (5.8) 
Labor income share  -0.011  (0.8)  -0.009  (0.6)  -0.024  (1.7) 
Per capita income  -0.059  (1.9)  -0.062  (1.7)  -0.114  (3.3) 
Income pc, squared  0.010  (1.6)  0.010  (1.5)  0.017  (2.7) 
Dummy Italy  0.011  (4.9)  0.011  (4.4)  0.019  (7.0) 
Financial Structure          0.005  (5.8) 
Creditor          -0.002  (3.2) 
       
N  207  171  171 
R-squared  0.307  0.303  0.426 
Absolute T-values are between parentheses.  
The analysis also has some other implications. Carree et al. calculate from the estimation re-
sults in Table 2 a country-uniform equilibrium for the business ownership rate, as a function 
of per capita income and per capita income squared.  The equilibrium is found to take on a 
U-shape in income per capita. With the additional determinants a U-shape still emerges. 
However, the minimum of this curve now lies outside the sample. This means that the shape 
of the equilibrium would be hyperbolic (L-shaped) rather than U-shaped for the sample ob-
served.  
Another implication is found in the second equation, where economic growth (per capita 
income) is explained by the absolute deviation of the actual business ownership rate from 
the calculated equilibrium rate. In Carree et al. (2002) this effect is seen to be negative. 
Thus, a deviation from the equilibrium rate leads to a “penalty” in economic growth. In our 
exercise this effect becomes insignificant. However, when the financial structure is allowed 
to be a determinant of the equilibrium rate
2, the growth penalty again emerges. 
 
1
   When the creditor variable is added to the model (without financial structure), the effect associated with secured 
creditor rights is insignificant. Financial Structure also turns out to be significant without inclusion of the creditor 
variable. Apparently, less secured creditor rights (and profitability) especially lead to more entrepreneurial activity 
in market based financial systems.  
2
   The equilibrium rate is then determined by per capita income and financial structure. A country’s particular equi-
librium rate thus also depends on the financial system – besides per capita income as a wealth measure.  
5  Acquiring additional financial determinants 
The financial determinants used in this paper enter the models as structural variables. The 
model used in chapter 4, however, ideally requires variables that vary over time. We calcu-
lated the annual values of the financial structure variable from the Worldbank database. It 
was found that the financial activity varied substantially within the countries. Most OECD 
countries develop towards the market-based system.  Table 3 sets out the results of the 
model using this enhanced variable. The estimated relations of model (III) still hold. The es-
timated effects of financial structure and unemployment are lower. 
Table 3  Estimation results for explaining the four-yearly change in business ownership rates 
across OECD countries in the period 1980-1996. Differences when Financial Structure 
is included as a time-variant variable. 




ies with time 
Constant  0.232   (4.6)   0.219  (4.3) 
Error correction coef.  0.176  (6.8)  0.196  (6.9) 
Unemployment  0.086  (5.8)  0.042  (2.7) 
Labor income share  -0.024  (1.7)  -0.025  (1.7) 
Per capita income  -0.114  (3.3)  -0.102  (2.9) 
Income pc, squared  0.017  (2.7)  0.014  (2.2) 
Dummy Italy  0.019  (7.0)  0.019  (6.7) 
Financial Structure  0.005  (5.8)  0.003  (5.2) 
Creditor  -0.002  (3.2)  -0.002  (2.7) 
     
N  171  166 
R-squared  0.426  0.409 
Absolute T-values are between parentheses.  
The exercises conducted in chapters 3 and 4 shade the conclusions drawn by Beck and Le-
vine. From our analysis, it is seen that the effect of market-based system plays a more posi-
tive role. Also, the role of creditor rights is addressed differently. It seems that creditor 
rights affect starting firms and existing firms differently. To further investigate this hypothe-
sis, some other financial determinants would be helpful. Especially some measurement of fi-
nancial activity towards starting entrepreneurs could improve the analysis. 
It should be possible to gather data on venture capital from the European Venture Capital 
Association (ECVA, http://www.evca.com/). The United States equivalent is the National 
Venture Capital Association (NCVA, http://www.nvca.org/). However, to obtain data for the 
entire 1980-1996 period will be difficult. 
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6  Discussion 
The present paper aimed at improving understanding of the effects of financial and legal 
systems on economic growth. Special attention was devoted to the effect of creditor rights. 
The methodology and results of an existing paper (Beck and Levine, 2000) were taken as 
point of departure. Our additional exercises focused on the OECD countries that were in-
cluded in the analysis of Beck and Levine. Moreover, an alternative model was applied. The 
following conclusions may be drawn from our exercises.  
1.  Focusing on OECD countries alters the conclusions drawn by Beck and Levine. 
a.  Contradictory to what Beck and Levine find, the most favorable financial structure 
system points at the direction of market-based systems. 
b.  Countries with secured creditor rights are associated with growth in value added, 
but not with growth in the number of firms. 
2.  Using a different model (again only for OECD countries) alters the conclusions drawn 
by Beck and Levine. 
a.  Using the alternative model, the results suggest that market-based systems are 
most favorable. 
b.  Using the alternative model, it is found that secured creditor rights have a negative 
impact on the growth in the number of firms. 
At this point it is not fully clear what the role of secured creditor rights is for economic 
growth. Our analyses suggest that – in OECD countries– a relaxation of creditor rights may 
enhance entrepreneurial activity. This conclusion can be drawn from the exercises with the 
error correction model.  
A country having growth in entrepreneurial activity generally exhibits increasing number of 
firms and decreasing average size. However, results using the model of Beck and Levine 
point at an increasing average size when creditor rights are highly secured. Existing expand-
ing firms can be the major cause this.  Investments by existent firms are generally less ac-
companied with the (perceived) risk that failure of the particular project may end up in liq-
uidation of the firm. Whether the rights of creditors are highly secured or not is then a less 
important issue for these firms.  From the creditor’s point of view however, security may still 
be important and total supply of capital may then increase with obtained security. 
Then, ideally, creditor rights should be relatively low for creditors of firm founders in order 
to achieve more entrepreneurial activity. Creditor rights should be at a higher level for 
achieving economic growth through crediting projects of existing firms.   Literature 
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Annex I    Estimation results 
Table I: Financial Structure, Legal Environment and Industry Growth  
  Structure-Activity    Structure-Size    Structure-Aggregate 
Structure-Act.  -
0.153 
(0.2)  -3.046 (2.6)             
Structure-Size        0.356 (0.2)  -1.430 (0.9)       
Structure-Aggr.              0.051 (0.0)  -3.668 (2.0) 
                 
Creditor  0.177 (0.3)  2.421 (1.9)    0.205 (0.4)  1.220 (1.2)    0.185 (0.3)  0.175 (1.6) 
Anti-director  0.014 (0.0)  0.788 (1.1)    -0.300 (0.3)  0.423 (0.4)    -0.100 (0.1)  1.478 (1.4) 
Rule of Law  0.959 (3.4)  1.016 (2.2)    0.875 (3.9)  0.287 (0.6)    0.900 (3.6)  0.613 (1.4) 
                 
Observations  1104 657   1104 657     1104 657
Adj. R-squared  0.26 0.43   0.27 0.47     0.27 0.44
Transparent cells are from Beck and Levine (2000). Shaded cells are estimates for selection of developed 
(OECD) countries. Bold figures are significant at 15 percent level%. T-values are between parentheses. 
Table II: Financial Structure, Legal Environment and the growth of the number of firms  
  Structure-Activity    Structure-Size    Structure-Aggregate 
Structure-Act.  0.547 (0.7)  0.512 (0.5)             
Structure-Size          0.505 (0.5)  1.269 (1.3)       
Structure-Aggr.                0.888 (0.7)  1.531 (1.3) 
                   
Creditor  0.751 (1.6)  -0.370 (0.3)    0.750 (1.5)  -0.409 (0.4)    0.755 (1.6)  -0.692 (0.7) 
Anti-director  -
0.268
(0.4)  -0.884 (1.1)    -0.279 (0.3)  -1.572 (1.7)    -0.467 (0.5)  -1.598 (1.6) 
Rule of Law  0.429 (1.6)  0.816 (2.2)    0.552 (3.1)  0.914 (2.7)    0.452 (2.0)  0.817 (2.4) 
                 
Observations  997  583     997 583     997  583  
Adj. R-squared  0.34  0.40     0.34 0.39     0.34  0.39  
Transparent cells are from Beck and Levine (2000). Shaded cells are estimates for selection of developed 
(OECD) countries. Bold figures are significant at 15 percent level%. T-values are between parentheses. 
Table III: Financial Structure, Legal Environment and growth of the average size of firms  
  Structure-Activity    Structure-Size    Structure-Aggregate 
Structure-Act.  -
0.164
(0.2)  -3.734 (2.8)               
Structure-Size          -0.584 (0.5)  -1.297 (1.0)       
Structure-Aggr.                -0.520 (0.4)  -3.256 (2.0) 
                   
Creditor  -
0.575
(1.1)  4.076 (2.0)    -0.584 (1.1)  1.514 (1.3)    -0.581 (1.1)  2.568 (1.9) 
Anti-director  -
0.532
(0.7)  1.880 (1.8)    -0.278 (0.3)  0.630 (0.6)    -0.338 (0.4)  1.772 (1.5) 
Rule of Law  0.372 (1.2)  0.260 (0.5)    0.377 (1.7)  -0.465 (1.1)    0.406 (1.5)  -0.249 (0.6) 
                     
Observations  970  567   970 567     970 567
Adj. R-squared  0.44  0.45   0.44 0.44     0.44 0.42
Transparent cells are from Beck and Levine (2000). Shaded cells are estimates for selection of developed 
(OECD) countries. Bold figures are significant at 15 percent level%. T-values are between parentheses. 
    
Table IV  Regression results using Financial Activity as the (market-based vs. bank-based) structure variable.  
  Model 0:  Beck & Levine (included variables: 
Financial Structure, Creditor, Anti Director 
and Rule of Law) 
Model 1: Model 0, plus Unemployment and 
Profitability (instead of Anti Director & Rule 
of Law) 
Model 2: Model 0, with an alternative meas-
ure for Creditor (i.e. dummy: is the creditor 
1
st beneficiary) 
Growth number of firms  All countries  OECD  OECD countries  All countries  OECD 
   1 All firms (in measurement of exter-
nal dependence) 
Creditor (+)  
Rule of Law (+)  
Rule of Law (+)   Unemployment (-)   Creditor (+)  
Rule of Law (+) 
Rule of Law (+)  
   2. Young firms  Creditor (+)  
Rule of Law (+)  
Rule of Law (+)   Unemployment (-)   Rule of Law (+)   Rule of Law (+)  
   3. Mature firms  Rule of Law (+)   Rule of Law (+)   Profitability (+)  
Creditor (+) 
Rule of Law (+)   Rule of Law (+)  
Growth average size  All countries  OECD  OECD countries  All countries  OECD 
   1 All firms  No Variable sig-
nificant 
FS: Bank based  
Anti director (+) 
Creditor (+) 
FS: Bank Based  No Variable signifi-
cant 
Creditor (+) 








   3. Mature firms  FS: Bank based  
Rule of Law (+) 
Creditor (+)  Unemployment (-)   No Variable signifi-
cant 
Creditor (+) 
Growth value added  All countries  OECD  OECD countries  All countries  OECD 
   1 All firms  Rule of Law (+)  FS: Bank based 
Creditor (+) 
Unemployment (-)  
Profitability (+)  
Rule of Law (+)   Creditor (+) 
   2. Young firms  Rule of Law (+)  FS: Bank based 
Anti director (+) 
Creditor (+) 
Unemployment (-)   Rule of Law (+)   FS: Bank based 
   3. Mature firms  FS: Bank based 
Rule of Law (+). 
FS: Bank based Anti 
director (+)  
Unemployment (-)   Rule of Law (+)   Creditor (+) 
Note: Each entry shows variables that are significant at 15 percent level and the associated sign. For the Financial Structure variable (FS) it is indicated whether the associated direction is bank 
based or market based. The model is estimated with the Instrumental Variables technique, using Legal Origin dummies and religion variables as instruments. The complete estimation results 
are available on request.    
Annex II  Data on financial development, financial structure and legal instruments 
COUNTRY  FIN_ACT FIN_SIZE FIN_AGG FIN_DUM STR_ACT  STR_SIZE  STR_AGG STR_DUM CREDITOR ANTI_DIR RULE_LAW
Australia  6.76 4.77 0.92 1 -1.19  0.05  1.18 1 1 4 10
Austria  5.23 4.48 0.43 1 -3.55  -2.8  -1.35 0 3 2 10
Bangladesh  -1.45 2.70 -2.06 0 -6.73  -2.66  -2.3 0     
Belgium  4.34 3.87 -0.15 0 -2.27  -0.27  0.63 1 2 0 10
Brazil  4.72 3.49 -0.32 0 -0.98  -0.3  1.03 1 1 3 6.32
Canada  6.77 4.76 0.92 1 -1.35  -0.06  1.06 1 1 5 10
Chile  4.23 4.24 0.08 0 -3.46  -0.75  -0.06 0 2 5 7.02
Colombia  1.95 3.34 -0.97 0 -3.86  -1.47  -0.63 0 0 3 2.08
Costa Rica  -0.91 3.13 -1.66 0 -6.65  -1.34  -1.46 0     
Denmark  4.70 4.09 0.07 0 -2.8  -0.9  0.07 1 3 2 10
Egypt  1.70 3.46 -0.93 0 -4.82  -1.85  -1.18 0 4 2 4.17
Finland  4.99 4.28 0.25 1 -3.1  -1.33  -0.3 0 1 3 10
France  6.01 4.65 0.69 1 -2.83  -1.73  -0.45 0 0 3 8.98
Germany  7.26 4.67 0.95 1 -1.64  -1.59  0.02 1 3 1 9.23
Greece  2.59 3.92 -0.46 0 -4.47  -1.62  -0.92 0 1 2 6.18
India  4.48 3.51 -0.36 0 -2.04  -1.53  -0.07 0 4 5 4.17
Israel  6.37 4.30 0.53 1 -1.32  -0.56  0.76 1 4 3 4.82
Italy  5.01 4.09 0.13 0 -2.79  -1.57  -0.34 0 2 1 8.33
Japan  8.80 5.38 1.73 1 -0.77  -0.35  1.07 1 2 4 8.98
Jordan  5.85 4.66 0.67 0 -2.21  -0.14  0.73 1  1 4.35
Korea  6.90 4.40 0.70 1 -1.04  -1.03  0.57 1 3 2 10
Malaysia  6.55 4.87 0.95 1 -1.68  0.11  1.05 1 4 4 6.78
Mexico  3.50 2.81 -1.02 0 -1.27  -0.81  0.62 1 0 1 5.35
Morocco  0.65 3.13 -1.36 0 -5.19  -2.15  -1.49 0     
Netherlands  7.31 4.99 1.18 1 -1.65  -0.75  0.54 1 2 2 10
New Zealand  5.34 4.37 0.38 0 -1.39  0.62  1.46 1 3 4 10
Nigeria  -1.12 3.05 -1.76 0 -6.68  -1.41  -1.52 0 4 3 2.73
Norway  5.75 4.56 0.59 0 -2.44  -1.38  -0.11 0 2 4 10
Pakistan  2.59 3.34 -0.84 0 -3.75  -1.7  -0.73 0 4 5 3.03
Peru  1.40 2.70 -1.50 0 -2.84  -0.46  0.32 1 0 3 2.5
Philippines  4.09 3.64 -0.35 0 -2.49  -1.17  0 0 0 3 2.73
Portugal  4.23 4.31 0.12 1 -4.26  -2.66  -1.49 0 1 3 8.68
Singapore  7.82 5.35 1.51 1 -1.1  0.39  1.42 1 4 4 8.57
SouthAfrica  6.03 5.23 1.08 0 -2.09  0.88  1.39 1 3 5 4.42
Spain  5.71 4.43 0.49 1 -2.71  -1.55  -0.3 0 2 4 7.8
Sri Lanka  0.74 3.23 -1.28 0 -5.09  -0.97  -0.73 0 3 3 6.25
Sweden  6.68 4.83 0.94 1 -1.6  -0.3  0.83 1 2 3 10
Turkey  0.98 2.83 -1.50 0 -4.4  -2.1  -1.19 0 2 2 5
UK  7.14 4.72 0.96 1 -0.76  0.15  1.38 1 4 5 8.57
US  8.11 5.15 1.44 1 -0.86  -0.24  1.1 1 1 5 10
Venezuela  2.51 4.02 -0.41 0 -4.65  -1.61  -0.98 0  1 6.37
Zimbabwe  2.86 3.32 -0.80 0 -2.6  -0.47  0.4 1 4 3 3.68
Source: Beck et al. (1999) and La Porta et al. (1999) 